For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen. —Romans 11:36

How is this Law Said to be Written in their Hearts? (Burgess)
Extract. Anthony Bugess, Vindiciæ legis: or, a vindication of the morall law and the covenants, from the errours of papists, Arminians, Socinians, and more especially, Antinomians. In XXX. lectures, preached at Laurence-Jury, London, Lecture VI.

A Two-Fold Writing of the Law in Men’s Hearts, and Which Here Meant

The [first] question is, How is this law said to be written in their hearts? This should not be compared, as Augustine did, with the gracious promise in Jeremiah, where God writes His law in the hearts of His people (Jer. 31:31-34). There are, therefore, two ways in which the law is written in the hearts of men: Firstly, as knowledge and judgment, whereby they understand what is good and bad. Secondly, in the will and affections, by inclining and delighting them to do good on solid grounds. The latter is referred to by the Prophet in the Covenant of Grace, whereas the former is to be understood here, as will be evident when compared with Romans 1:19.

The Law Written in Men’s Hearts in Two Ways

The last question is, How do they demonstrate this law written in their hearts? Externally, they do so in two ways: Firstly, by establishing good and wholesome laws to govern their people. Secondly, by practicing, at least to some extent, according to those laws. Internally, they do so through their consciences, finding comfort or fear therein.

Observation: There is a law of Nature inscribed in the hearts of men. If this law is not abolished and believers are bound to follow its direction and obligation, how can the Antinomian argue that the Moral Law, in terms of its commanding power, ceases to be valid? Now, since I intend to present a methodical treatise on the various kinds of God’s Law, one might expect me to discuss Laws in general at length. However, many have written extensive volumes on this topic, particularly the Schoolmen, and they have offered valuable rational insights. Yet, as it may not be directly relevant to my objective, I shall refrain from delving into it. Thus, I won’t delve into the etymology of the words signifying “Law,” whether lex in Latin comes from legendo [to read] because it was written to be read (although that’s not always necessary), or from ligando [to bind] because a law binds to obedience, or from deligendo [to select] because it selects some precepts. Nor will I dwell on νόμος (“nomos”) [law] in Greek, whether it comes from νοῦς (“nous”) [mind], which is improbable, or from νέμειν (“nemein”) [to distribute], because it distributes to everyone that which is right. Similarly, I won’t delve into the Hebrew word “תּורה” [Torah], some claiming it comes from “הָרָי” (“yarah”) meaning “to instruct and teach,” while others link it to the word “תּוֹר” (“towr”) signifying a disposition or compilation of things together, as laws usually are.

Instead, I will move on to the definition of a law, whether it is an act, a habit, or the soul itself. However, it is essential to note one point against a fundamental error of the Antinomians concerning laws in general. For they deem it impossible but that the damning act of a law must be where the commanding act of a law is, and this is frequently urged (as I explained last time). Therefore observe, that only two things constitute the essence of a law (I am not referring to external causes):

  1. Direction, as a law is a rule; thus, the law of God is compared to a light. In Proverbs 20:27, there is a notable expression about the Law of Nature: It’s a candle of the Lord, searching the inwards of the belly. It is also observed that the Chaldee word for law is synonymous with light.
  2. The second essential element of a law is obligation, for therein lies the offence of a sin, that it breaks this law, presupposing its obligatory force.

In the next place, there are two consequents of the Law which are ad bene esse, ‘that the Law may be better obeyed’; and this indeed turns the Law into a covenant, which is another notion upon it, as afterwards is to be shown. Now as for the sanction of the Law by way of a promise, that is a mere free thing; God, by reason of that dominion which he had over man, might have commanded his obedience, and yet never have made a promise of eternal life unto him. And as for the other consequent act of the law, to curse, and punish, this is but an accidental act, and not necessary to a law; for it comes in upon supposition of transgression: and therefore, as we may say of a magistrate, he was a just and complete magistrate for his time, though he put forth no punitive justice, if there are no malefactors offending; so it is about a law, a law is a complete law obliging even if it does not actually curse. As in the confirmed angels, it never had any more than obligatory, and mandatory acts upon them; for that they were under a law is plain, because otherwise they could not have sinned, for where there is no law, there is no transgression. If therefore the Antinomian were rectified in this principle, which is very true and plain, he would quickly be satisfied: but of this more in another place. But we come to the particulars of the doctrine, the pressing of which will serve much against the Antinomian. Therefore, for the better understanding of this Law of Nature, consider these particulars:

The Law of Nature Consists in Those Common Notions Which are Ingrafted in all Men’s Hearts

  1. The nature of it in which it consists, and that is in those common notions and maxims, which are ingrafted in all men’s hearts: and some of these are speculative, e.g. that there is a God; and some practical, e.g. that good is to be embraced, and evil avoided: and therefore Aquinas says well, that what “principles of sciences are in things of demonstration, the same are these rules of nature in practicals:” therefore we cannot give any reasons of them; but, as the sun manifests itself by its own light, so do these. Hence, Chrysostom observes well, that God, forbidding murder, and other sins, gives no reason of it, because it’s natural: but, speaking of the seventh day, why that in particular was to be observed, he gives a reason, because on the seventh day the Lord rested, not but that the seventh day is moral—as some have denied—but because it’s not naturally moral, only positively moral, as the learned show.

Some Fragments Only of This Law Left in Us

  1. The differences of its being in Adam and in us. This is necessary to observe; for it was perfectly implanted in Adam’s heart, but we have only some fragments, and a mere shadow of it left in us. The whole Law of Nature, as it was perfectly teaching us the will of God, was then communicated to him: and howsoever God, for good reasons hereafter to be mentioned, did give, besides that Law of Nature, a positive law to try his obedience; yet the other cannot be denied to have been in him, seeing he was made after God’s image, in righteousness, and holiness, and otherwise Adam would have been destitute of the light of reason, and without a conscience. Therefore it’s a most impudent thing for Socinus to deny that Adam had any such law or precept, and that he could not lie, or commit any other sin even had he wanted to; for, it may not be doubted, that if Adam had told a lie, or the like, it would have been a sin, just like the eating of the forbidden fruit.

Those Common Notions, in Which this Law Consists, are in us by Nature

  1. The natural impression of it in us. We have it by nature; not a superadded work of God to put this into us. This assertion is much opposed by Flaccus Illyricus, who, out of his vehement desire to aggravate original sin in us, and to show how destitute we are of the image of God, labors to show, that those common notions and dictates of conscience are infused de novo [anew] into us [in regeneration], and that we have none of these by nature in us. And a godly man, in his Book of Temptations, holds the same opinion. Illyricus indeed has many probable arguments for his opinion, but he goes upon a false supposition, that the Apostle his scope is, to compare a Gentile supposed only to do the Law, and not asserted to do it, before a Jew who was an hearer of the Law, but not a doer of it: therefore, to debase the Jew, he says, the Apostle speaks conditionally, to this purpose, “If an Heathen should keep the Law, though he be not circumcised, yet he would be preferred before you; not that the Apostle means assertively and positively that any such do:” and therefore presses the word ὅταν [whenever, when], which is a particle of the subjunctive mood, and is equivalent to ἐὰν [if], If the Gentiles, etc. But his supposition is false; for the Apostle’s scope is, to show that the Gentile has no excuse if God condemns him, because he has a law in himself: as appears in verse 12. As for the other consideration of ὅταν, though Erasmus renders it [cum fecerint, ‘when/after they did so’]; yet that particle is applied to the indicative mood, as well as the subjunctive. It cannot therefore be true, which he says, that the Apostle speaks such great things of men by nature, that if they were true, it would necessarily justify all Pelagianism. I shall not speak of his many arguments against natural principles and knowledge of a God; for he in effect at last yields to it.
  2. The extent of it. And here it’s very hard to measure out the bounds of the Law of Nature; for, some have judged certain things to be condemned by the Law of Nature, which others thought the Law of Nature approved: so true is that of Tertullian, Legem Naturæ opiniones suas vocant, ‘They call their opinions the Law of Nature’. There are four ways of bounding this Law.

Four Bounds of the Law of Nature

  1. Some make it those general things, wherein man and beast agree; as in defense of itself, and desire of life: but by this means, that of natural honesty and righteousness would be excluded; for, a beast is not capable of any sin, or obligation by a law. And howsoever that be much disputed upon, Why God would have the beast killed that killed a man; yet, to omit the thoughts of many about it, that was not because a beast could be tied by a law: but God, to show the horridness of the act, would have the very instrument punished.
  2. Some bound it by the custom of Nations, that is, jus Gentium; but that is so diversified, that a sin with some was a virtue with others.
  3. Some bind it by reason in every man: but this is very uncertain, and one man’s reason is contrary to another’s, and one man’s conscience is larger than another’s; even as it is with measures in diverse countries, though they have the same name, as a bushel, etc. yet they are different in quantity, one is larger than another.
  4. Lastly, Others bound it by the will of God, declared and manifested to Noah in seven precepts, and afterwards to Moses in the Ten Commandments: but these extend the Law of Nature not only to first principles, but conclusions also deduced from thence.

The Obligation of the Law of Nature is from God

  1. The obligation of it, when the Law of Nature does bind: and that is from God the author of it, God only is under no law. Every believer, though justified by Christ, is under the Moral Law of Moses, as also the law of Nature: but now this Law of Nature does not so properly bind, as it’s man’s reason or conscience, as that it is the vicegerent of God, or a command from him: and thus Cain by the Law of Nature found a tie upon him not to sin, and guilt because he did sin in murdering his brother, although there was not Moral Law as yet given. It is true, indeed, our Divines do well reprove the papists, for calling all that time from Adam to Moses, as state, or Law of Nature: and this the papists do, that therefore to offer sacrifice unto God may be proved from the Law of Nature; whereas those sacrifices being done in faith, had the word of God, otherwise we were bound still to offer lambs and kids to God, which they deny.

The Obligation of the Law of Nature is Perpetual and Immutable

  1. The perpetuity of this obligation. This Law can never be abrogated. And herein we may demand of the antinomian, Whether the Law of Nature binds a believer, or no? Whether he be bound to obey the dictates of his natural conscience? Suppose a believer has his natural conscience dictating to him, This sin he may not do; is he not obliged hereunto not only from the matter—for that he grants—but as it is a law and command of God implanted in his soul? I know there is a difference between the Law of Nature, and the Ten Commandments, as may be shown hereafter; but yet they agree int his, that they are a rule immutable, and of perpetual obligation. Therefore think not, that because he died to free you from the curse of the Law, that therefore you are freed from the obedience unto the Natural Law, or delivered by Moses. To deny this, is to deny that a believer is bound to obey the sure dictates of a natural conscience. I know we are not always bound to follow what conscience suggests, for that is obscured and darkened; but I speak of those dictates which are naturally known.

Other particulars, as, The insufficiency of it to direct in worship, as also, to save men, I do put off, and make application of what has been delivered.

Use 1. Of Instruction, against the antinomian, who must needs overthrow the directive and obligative force of the Law of Nature, as well as that of Moses; Does not even Nature teach you—says the Apostle—Now if a man may not care for Moses’ teaching, need he care for Nature’s teaching? It is true sometimes they grant the Law to be a rule, but then afterwards they speak such things as are absolutely inconsistent with it.

There were some—as Wendelinus reports—Swencfeldians, that held a man was never truly mortified, till he had put out all sense of conscience for sin; if his conscience troubled him, that was his imperfection, he was not mortified enough. I should do the antinomians wrong, if I should say, they deliver such things in their books; but let them consider, whether some of their positions will not carry them near such a dangerous rock: For, if the Law has nothing to do with me in respect of the mandatory part of it, then if I be troubled for the breach of it, it is my weakness, because I am not enough in Christ.

Use 2. Of Reproof, to those who live against this Law. Sins that are against the Law of Nature do most terrify. How many live in such sins that the Law of Nature condemns? Does not Nature condemn lying, cozening in your trades, lusts, and uncleanness? How many tradesmen are there that need not a Paul? Even Tully in his Book of Offices condemns their lying, sophisticate wares, and unlawful gain. It’s much how far they saw this way. Sins against the natural conscience are called ‘crying sins’; and, though men have repented of them, yet how long is it before faith can still their cry? Have not many heathens been faithful and just in their dealings? It’s true, that man has not godliness, who has only natural honesty; therefore there are many spiritual sins that he never humbles himself for: as Paul says, he knew not the motions of his heart to be sin. Hence men are to be exhorted to get further light, and more tenderness than a natural conscience can ever attain unto. Nevertheless, if men so live, as if they had not this Law in their hearts, they are the more inexcusable: Are there not men who call themselves Christians, that yet the very heathens will condemn at that great day?

Use 3. Why it is so hard to believe in the Lord Christ; because here is nothing of Nature in it, it’s all supernatural. The papists say, we make an easy way to heaven; for, let a man be never so great a sinner, yet if he but believes, all is well. Now the people of God, sensible of their own sin, find nothing harder: for, it’s in the Law of Nature they should not lie, or steal, but that they should believe in Christ for pardon, when laboring under their offences, here Nature does not help at all. I acknowledge it’s a dispute among Divines, Whether in that Law implanted in Adam’s heart, there was not also a power to believe in Christ, when revealed? But of that hereafter; but the orthodox deny, that he had explicit justifying faith, for that was repugnant to the condition he was in. But the thing I intend is, to show how supernatural and hidden the way of believing is. No marvel therefore if it be made such a peculiar work of the Spirit, to convince of this sin.

Westminster Assembly
Anthony Burgess
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Anthony Burgess (1600-1663), divine, was a son of a schoolmaster at Watford, but not related to Cornelius Burgess the minister, or John Burgess [q. v.] his predecessor at Sutton Coldfield. He entered St. John’s College, Cambridge, in 1623, and became fellow of Emmanuel. Here he was a tutor of the famous John Wallis, who mentions him with respect in the autobiographical notes prefixed to Hearne’s edition of ‘Langtoft.’ He became vicar of Sutton Coldfield, Warwickshire. During the civil war he took refuge in Coventry, and lectured the parliamentary garrison. He was a member of the Westminster Assembly. After the Restoration he was ejected from Sutton Coldfield, and lived at Tamworth. The bishop of Lichfield (Hacket) is said to have begged him to conform, declaring that he was fit to be professor at a university.

He published various separate sermons, including a funeral sermon on Thomas Blake, which Wood had not seen, but a copy of which is in the British Museum, and 1. ‘Vindiciæ Legis, a Vindication of the Moral Law . . . (against Antinomians) in twenty-nine lectures at Lawrence Jury,’ 1646. 2. ‘The True Doctrine of Justification asserted . . . (against Arminians, &c.), in thirty lectures at Lawrence Jury,’ 1648. 3. ‘Spiritual Refining’ (120 sermons), 1652. 4. ‘Expository Sermons (145) on the 17th chapter of the Gospel according to St. John,’ 1656. 5. ‘The Scripture Directory … a Practical Commentary upon the whole third chapter of the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, to which is annexed the Godly and Natural Man’s Choice, &c.,’ 1659. 6. ‘Doctrine of Original Sin asserted,’ 1659.

[Palmer and Calamy, iii. 350; Wood’s Athenæ (Bliss), iii. 432; Chronicle of Peter de Langtoft (Hearne), 1725, i. cxlviii; Sylvester’s Baxter, iii. 93.]


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